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I
INTRODUCTION
During the past five years we have experienced unprecedented success in
our capital markets, marked by a record number of registered public offerings,
a record amount of capital raised in the primary market for securities, and a re-
cord volume and appreciation in our nation’s secondary markets for securities.1
For the first time, investors have invested more money in mutual funds than the
amount on deposit in our commercial banks.2  These positive developments
have occurred not in a laissez-faire system, but in a dual regulatory system pro-
viding both federal regulation and remedies and state regulation and remedies.3
This dual regulatory system and the accountability it demands from corporate
management have provided the foundation for market confidence and market
success.4
The paradox is that this very success cyclically undermines the regulatory
process.  In a bull market so strong that even the dart throwers make money
and corporate issuers who have never produced earnings are enjoying oversub-
scribed offerings of equity securities, no one wants to hear about fraud and
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1. See David Barboza, Another Year of the Bull; Dow up 22%, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1998, at D1
(reporting that, at year-end, the Dow Jones industrial average for the first time in its 100-year history
had gained 20% or more for three consecutive years, an exemplification of the nation’s “Goldilocks
economy”).
2. See Thomas S. Mulligan, Investors Need to Be Wary of Abuse, Levitt Says, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 24,
1997, at D2.
3. See generally Manning Gilbert Warren III, Reflections on Dual Regulation of Securities: A Case
Against Preemption, 25 B.C. L. REV. 495 (1984).
4. See id. at 497.
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abuse.5  Moreover, as one commentator stated, “because bull markets tend to
push all stock prices up, many investment frauds remain hidden” and “only
when the bull turns tail do these swindles come to light.”6  In a recent New
York Times article, a journalist chronicled how above-average market returns
were bringing in stock promoters with criminal records.7  Similarly, a Business
Week cover story in December 1997 reported that organized crime had made
shocking inroads into the small-capitalization securities market.8  Thus, regula-
tion breeds the success that breeds complacency that, in turn, breeds resistance
to regulation.
In the past two years, this cycle has been fully exploited by corporate issuers
and their various support groups, including the American Electronics Associa-
tion, the National Association of Manufacturers, the Securities Industry Asso-
ciation9 and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.  Their
lobbying effort, generously supported by computer technology companies,
overwhelmed opponents representing rank and file investors, including the
American Association of Retired Persons, Public Citizen, and the Consumer
Federation of America.  It now appears that the strategic plan of this high-tech
lobby always has had three major objectives: (1) to erect insurmountable pro-
cedural barriers for plaintiffs in pursuing express and implied causes of action
under the federal securities laws; (2) to preempt state regulatory agencies from
enforcing pre-sale disclosure standards; and (3) to foreclose investors’ private
remedies under both state blue sky statutes and the common law.  The first two
objectives largely have been attained through passage of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“Reform Act”)10 and the National Securities
Market Improvement Act of 1996 (“NSMIA”).11  The third objective, the pre-
emption of private remedies traditionally afforded by state law, is being re-
                                                          
5. See Joseph A. Grundfest & Michael Perino, Securities Litigation Reform: The First Year’s Ex-
perience (visited Apr. 5, 1998), available at <http://securities.stanford.edu/report>.  Professors Grund-
fest & Perino found a 7-16% decline in the total volume of securities litigation in 1996 and suggested
that the “increasing stock market prices in 1996 may have depressed litigation activity.”  Id.
6. Gretchen Morgenson, Don’t Be a Victim, FORBES, June 2, 1997, at 42.
7. See David Barboza, On the Shady Side of the Bull Market, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1997, at C1;
see also Leslie Eaton, Investment Fraud Is Soaring Along with the Bull Market, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30,
1997, at A1.
8. See Gary Weiss, The Mob on Wall Street, BUS. WK., Dec. 16, 1996, at 92; see also Dean Stark-
man & Deborah Lohse, Charges Mark Wider Probe of Mob, Wall Street, WALL ST. J., Nov. 26, 1997, at
C1.
9. The position of the Securities Industry Association in supporting preemption of state blue sky
laws and the common law of fraud is particularly noteworthy.  Formerly the Investment Bankers Asso-
ciation, it opposed the development of state blue sky laws on the ground that simple fraud laws, which
did not require registration, full disclosure, or administrative review, afforded adequate protection
against securities fraud.  See MICHAEL E. PARRISH, SECURITIES REGULATION AND THE NEW DEAL 8
(1970).  When federal securities laws were first proposed, it withdrew its support, claiming that state
blue sky laws had eliminated the need for national regulation.  See id. at 20.
10. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (Supp. I 1995-96))
[hereinafter the Reform Act].
11. Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (Supp. I 1995-
96)) [hereinafter the NSMIA].
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lentlessly pursued in the form of proposed “uniform standards” legislation that
would federalize private causes of action for securities fraud.
This article begins with a brief description and analysis of the two bills al-
ready enacted, the Reform Act and NSMIA.  It then discusses the proposed
uniform standards legislation, as reflected in two bills recently introduced in the
U.S. House of Representatives12 and a third in the U.S. Senate.13  After analyz-
ing the normative arguments for and against this legislation, the article turns to
what I perceive to be present and developing constitutional limitations.  Coin-
cident to the current bull market and the so-called “securities reform move-
ment,” the Supreme Court has embarked on a case-by-case reinvigoration of
federalism and the dual sovereignty of state and federal governments some-
times obscured but ever-present in the bedrock of the Constitution.  In doing
so, a majority of the Court, comprised of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O’Connor, Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy, have focused not on preemption un-
der the Supremacy Clause, but rather on the limitations federalism imposes on
congressional power under the Commerce Clause.  I conclude that despite the
weight of normative arguments against preemption of investor remedies, pre-
dominant federalism postulates foreclose the proposed intrusion into investors’
tort remedies traditionally afforded by the states under centuries-old common
law.  Based upon my own “symmetrical analysis” of active and dormant Com-
merce Clause powers, I propose supplementation of the traditional “rational
basis” scope of review of commerce power legislation with a “strict scrutiny”
review where federal legislation, like the proposed uniform standards legisla-
tion, seeks to veto or significantly abrogate regulation in areas of traditional
state concern.
II
STATUTORY “REFORM”
A.  The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
The publicized justification for the Reform Act was to protect honest busi-
nesses from  frivolous class actions brought under the Securities and Exchange
Commission’s (“SEC”) Rule 10b-5 by greedy plaintiffs’ lawyers on behalf of
professional plaintiffs.  Although some abuses had occurred in the years lead-
ing to enactment, there was only negligible evidence of any explosion in the use
of the Rule 10b-5 class action remedy the new law sought to destroy.  In fact,
according to a widely circulated study by Professors Joseph Grundfest and Mi-
chael Perino of Stanford University Law School,14 the number of securities class
                                                          
12. Securities Litigation Improvement Act of 1997, H.R. 1653, 105th Cong; Securities Litigation
Uniform Standards Act of 1997, H.R. 1689, 105th Cong.
13. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1997, S. 1260, 105th Cong.
14. See Grundfest & Perino, supra note 5.
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actions had remained constant during the previous five years, and, interestingly,
has remained constant in the two years since its passage in 1995.15
In contrast to its ostensible purposes, the Reform Act imposed serious pro-
cedural obstacles for defrauded investors in both class actions and individual
actions for securities fraud.  The Reform Act tinkered with the class action
remedy by imposing job qualifications for class representatives and lead plain-
tiffs,16 and fee limitations on class attorneys.17  Instead of exercising legislative
restraint, Congress proceeded not only to fix the perceived failures of the class
action, but also to fix investor remedies in individual lawsuits.  This “fixing” ac-
tually amounted to a “breaking” of remedies that had well-served investors and
their marketplace for half a century.  The Reform Act heightened pleading
standards for defrauded investors to dizzying heights,18 while at the same time
imposing a discovery blackout once a motion to dismiss has been filed.19  At this
stage of any civil proceeding, it must be remembered that the court must accept
as true all allegations in the complaint,20 yet Congress has challenged securities
fraud victims not only by building a higher wall but by forcing them to climb it
in the dark.
The Reform Act then created safe harbors for projections and other for-
ward-looking statements21—provisions so ill-conceived that they have been
criticized by prominent commentators as creating a license to lie.22  And, if
                                                          
15. See National Economic Research Associates, Federal Shareholder Class Action Filings Rise to
Pre-Reform Act Levels as State Filings Fall, (July 1997 report, on file with author) [hereinafter NERA
1997 Study].
16. See Reform Act, Sec. 101(a), § 27(a)(2)(A), (a)(3)(B), 109 Stat. 737, 737-39 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 77z-1 (Supp. I 1995-96)); id. Sec. 101(b), § 21D(a)(2)(A), (a)(3)(B), 109 Stat. 737, 743-45
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (Supp. I 1995-96)).
17. See id. Sec. 101(a), § 27(a)(6), 109 Stat. 737, 740 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(6) (Supp. I
1995-96)); id. Sec. 101(b), § 21D(a)(6), 109 Stat. 737, 745 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(6) (Supp. I
1995-96)).
18. Id.  See id. Sec. 101(b), § 21D(b)(2), 109 Stat. 737, 747 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (Supp. I
1995-96)); see also UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, OFFICE OF GENERAL
COUNSEL, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS ON THE FIRST YEAR OF PRACTICE
UNDER THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995 14 n.36 (Apr. 1997) (on file
with author) [hereinafter REFORM ACT REPORT].
19. See Reform Act, Sec. 101(a), § 27(b)(1), 109 Stat. 737, 741 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1
(Supp. I 1995-96)); id. Sec. 101(b), § 21D(b)(3)(B), 109 Stat. 737, 747 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4
(Supp. I 1995-96)).
20. In Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), the Supreme Court held that a complaint should not
be dismissed for failure to state a claim “unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no
set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”  Id. at 45-46.  Despite the Reform
Act’s heightened pleading requirements, a number of courts have been reluctant to permit these re-
quirements to prejudice the plaintiff’s claims.  See, e.g., Rehm v. Eagle Finance Corp., 954 F. Supp.
1246 (N.D. Ill. 1997); see also Cooper v. Pickett, 122 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 1997), opinion amended on
other grounds, 1998 WL 32678; Fischler v. Amsouth Bancorporation, No. 96-1567-CIV-T-17A, 1996
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17670 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 14, 1996).
21. See Reform Act, Sec. 102(a), § 27A, 109 Stat. 737, 749 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2 (Supp. I
1995-96)); id. Sec. 102(b), § 21E ,109 Stat. 737, 753 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5 (Supp. I 1995-96)).
22. For example, Professor John C. Coffee, Jr., has noted that the most striking feature of the Re-
form Act’s safe harbor “is the immunity it seems to give to a bald, knowing lie that is surrounded by
‘meaningful cautionary statements.’”  John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future of the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act: Or, Why the Fat Lady Has Not Yet Sung, 51 BUS. LAW. 975, 989 (1996).
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hope springs eternal and we assume the fraud victim can clear these hurdles
and ultimately secure a verdict, the cheated investor will find that the joint and
several liability traditionally afforded defendants has been replaced with a
highly complex system of proportionate liability.23  Under this particular
“reform,” defendants found to have been primary violators of the securities
laws are assigned only proportionate liability if their proven intent to deceive
investors was based on reckless misconduct.24  Originally, the high-tech lobby
had insisted that “recklessness” be eliminated altogether as conduct satisfying
Rule 10b-5’s scienter requirement,25 but, at least for the time being, was satis-
fied with proportionate liability coupled with new pleading standards requiring
particularity in averring the required state of mind.26
The passage of the Reform Act seems to have worked little change in the
number of securities class actions filed by investors.  Roughly the same number
of actions has been filed annually in the past two years as was filed annually
during the three-year period preceding enactment.27  The Grundfest and Perino
study, however, highlighted what the authors termed the “substitution effect,”
claiming that the Reform Act caused a significant shift of activity from federal
to state courts.28  According to the study, approximately twenty-six percent of
securities class action claims during the year following enactment were state
court proceedings without parallel federal claims filed, and that at least twenty-
eight percent of federal class action cases had pending parallel state actions.29
However, further study through the first five months of 1997 belied the Grund-
fest-Perino report of a “boom” in state class action securities actions.  National
Economic Research Associates, Inc. (“NERA”) found the 1996 trend to have
been transient.30  During the first four months of 1997, only nineteen cases were
filed in state court, representing a significant slowdown in state court filings.31
Projections for 1997 indicated that only fifty-seven cases would be filed in state
                                                          
23. See Reform Act, Sec. 201(a), § 21D(g), 109 Stat. 737, 758 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (Supp.
I 1995-96)).
24. See id.
25. Every federal circuit has held that recklessness satisfies the scienter requirement for primary
violations of Rule 10b-5, but the Supreme Court has repeatedly reserved the question.  See Manning
Gilbert Warren III, The Primary Liability of Securities Lawyers, 50 S.M.U. L. REV. 383, 385 n.14
(1996).
26. The conference report accompanying the Reform Act noted that the bill was not intended to
change “the state of mind requirements of existing law.”  H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 38 (1995),
reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 737.  For a useful discussion of the Reform Act’s inconsistent
treatment of the “recklessness” issue, see Dennis T. Rice, A Practitioner’s View of Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 283, 287-88 (1997).
27. See SEC Finds Number of Class Actions Rose in 1997 to Pre-Reform Law Levels, 30 Sec. Reg.
& L. Rep. (BNA) 275 (Feb. 20, 1998).  According to SEC data, 175 and 105 companies were sued un-
der the Reform Act in 1997 and 1996, respectively, compared to 158 companies in 1995, 221 companies
in 1994, and 153 companies in 1993.  See id.
28. Grundfest & Perino, supra note 5.
29. See id.
30. See NERA 1997 Study, supra note 15, at 1.
31. See id. at 2.
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court and 187 in federal court,32 figures that correlate closely with the number
of cases filed annually during the five years prior to passage of the Reform
Act.33  Clearly, litigation has not boomed, as Grundfest and Perino conceded in
Senate testimony last summer:  “Analysis of litigation activity through June 30,
1997, reveals that the overall number of companies sued in securities class ac-
tions appears to be roughly equivalent to the number sued prior to the Reform
Act.”34
While acknowledging the decline in state court filings, Grundfest and
Perino nevertheless have clung to their “substitution effect” theory, reporting
that ninety-two of 238 post-Reform Act class action cases involved “at least
some state component.”35  This appears to be a case of a theory in search of its
own evidence, for in the same testimony, the authors urged Congress to adopt
uniform standards legislation, which would amend the savings clauses in the
federal securities statutes to preempt investors’ state securities fraud reme-
dies.36  Both the House and Senate versions of the proposed legislation would
preempt fraud, misrepresentation, and other remedies traditionally provided
investors under state law, whether asserted in state courts, federal courts, or,
arguably, in arbitration proceedings.  Moreover, former SEC Commissioner
Steven Wallman has stated that Reform Act proponents had planned from day
one to begin by restricting federal remedies, and subsequently to preempt the
corollary remedies historically provided by the states.  In a recent interview,
Wallman stated that these proponents believed that to argue for passage of the
Reform Act and “to advocate for the preemption of the states at the same
time . . . would just be too difficult,” adding that he believed “there was a real
choice made by a lot of people working on” the Reform Act to postpone pre-
emption legislation to a later date.37
The legislative strike at the regulatory domain of state securities agencies
would not be postponed for long.  The second objective of the high-tech lobby’s
strategic plan was achieved in less than a year after passage of the Reform Act.
Congress enacted sweeping legislation that preempted state blue sky laws ad-
ministered by state securities commissions for decades before Congress sup-
plemented the states’ regulatory systems by enacting federal securities legisla-
tion.38
                                                          
32. See id. at 1-2.
33. See id. at 1.
34. Joseph A. Grundfest & Michael Perino, Ten Things We Know and Ten Things We Don’t Know
About the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, at 5 (written testimony before the Senate
Subcommittee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, July 24,1997) (on file
with author).
35. Id. at 6.
36. See id. at 22.
37. Rachel Witmer, SEC Commissioner Wallman Sees Need for Uniform Standards Law, 29 Sec.
Reg & L. Rep. (BNA) 1259 (Sept. 12, 1997).
38. See S. REP. NO. 47, at 2 (1933), reprinted in J.S. ELLENBERGER & ELLEN P. MAHAR, 2
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECEURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
(1973).
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B.  The National Securities Market Improvement Act
Congress passed the NSMIA during the 1996 presidential election, after
hearings that were described even by proponents of the statute as biased and
one-sided.  In contrast to the policies underlying the savings clauses in the fed-
eral securities laws, Congress has acted to preempt a substantial portion of
state securities laws enacted by state legislatures and administered by state
regulatory agencies since shortly after the turn of the century.  In its zeal to
court the high-tech lobby, Congress seemed to have forgotten that the federal
securities laws were enacted to supplement state securities laws based on en-
forcement dilemmas occasioned by the jurisdictional limitations on the states’
police powers, or, as Justice William Douglas pointed out in Travelers Health
Association v. Virginia, “to fill a gap.”39  Now, more than sixty years later, Con-
gress has created its own gaps in the securities laws of the states and in the en-
tire investor protection regime.
In the NSMIA, Congress has stretched its preemptive power under the
Commerce Clause beyond constitutional limits in order to dictate its own limits
on the states in defining their respective regulatory spheres.  Among other
things, it has unilaterally “withdrawn” the preexisting power of the states to re-
quire pre-sale disclosures by issuers and to conduct pre-sale disclosure review,
merit review, or any other kind of fairness review in connection with most pub-
lic and private offerings of securities conducted within their respective jurisdic-
tions.40  The federal statute orders the states to impose no limits or conditions
on any “covered security”41 and has foreclosed the revenue raising function tra-
ditionally associated with state permitting requirements.42
The newly coined term “covered security” has to be one of the grandest
misnomers financial legislation has ever seen.  “Covered” refers not only to se-
curities subject to the federal pre-sale disclosure regime but also to a compre-
hensive array of securities and securities transactions exempt from the federal
regime and hence not “covered” at all at the federal level and, from the
NSMIA forward, not “covered” by the states either.43  The term “covered secu-
rity” encompasses virtually all public and private offerings of securities issued
by companies whose securities are traded on the New York (“NYSE”) or
American Stock Exchanges (“AMEX”) or on the NASDAQ National Market
System and all securities issued by mutual funds.44  The term also includes all
                                                          
39. Travelers Health Ass’n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 653 (1950) (Douglas, J., concurring).
40. See NSMIA Sec. 102(a), § 18(a), 110 Stat. 3416, 3417 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 77r (1997)).
41. See id. Sec. 102(a), § 18(a)(2)(3), 110 Stat. 3416, 3417-18 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77r (Supp. I
1995-96)).
42. See id. Sec. 102(a), § 18(c)(2)(D), 110 Stat. 3416, 3420 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77r (Supp. I
1995-96)).
43. See id. Sec. 102(a), § 18(b)(1-4), 110 Stat. 3416, 3418-19 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77r (Supp. I
1995-96)).
44. See id. Sec. 102(a), § 18(b)(1)(A), 110 Stat. 3416, 3418 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77r (Supp. I
1995-96)).
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securities sold to so-called “qualified purchasers,”45 as defined from time to
time by the SEC, and most of the securities and securities transactions exempt
from federal registration under sections 3(a)46 and 447 of the Securities Act of
1933 (“1933 Act”), including all private offerings exempt under Rule 506 of the
SEC’s Regulation D.48  Congress apparently had forgotten that it had enacted
these exemptions from registration at the federal level based on its own recog-
nition at the time of the 1933 Act’s passage that sufficient pre-sale regulatory
protection already was being provided at the state level.  Moreover, it appar-
ently had forgotten that substantial congressional opposition to the 1933 Act’s
disclosure-only regime had been overcome by preserving state regimes that
provided merit review and localized scrutiny of securities offerings and their is-
suers.49  In its haste to enact the NSMIA, Congress ignored much of the legisla-
tive history of the federal securities laws, and, consequently, the underlying
policies that established the dual regulatory system in the first place.
Having gutted the states’ pre-sale disclosure and merit review regulation,
Congress did not undertake to abolish state securities commissions or their
authority to investigate and enforce their own differing laws of fraud and de-
ceit.  In other words, Congress determined that the states could prosecute issu-
ers after the sale of those very securities Congress would not allow them to re-
view before these securities were sold.  In preserving the states’ post-sale anti-
fraud enforcement authority, Congress clearly demonstrated the irrationality of
the NSMIA’s ostensible policy promoting national uniformity.  After all, dif-
fering enforcement decisions under the states’ disparate anti-fraud laws could
produce significant inconsistencies between federal and state disclosure stan-
dards, and, hence, do not serve the goal of regulatory uniformity the NSMIA
ostensibly sought to achieve.
In addition, Congress decided to ameliorate state concerns that because of
eliminated registration fees, new financial resources would have to be found to
fund the states’ newly limited role as “cops on the beat.”  To diffuse opposition
from state regulatory agencies, Congress agreed to preserve the fees payable to
the states for registration of the very securities offerings that states were no
longer allowed to regulate.  In doing so, Congress disregarded the essential pos-
tulates of federalism by expressly providing in the statute that for three years
after the NSMIA’s enactment, issuers would have to buy the benefits of pre-
emption by paying filing or registration fees to those states that still required
them.50  The statute provides that should these nonregistrants refuse to pay the
fees, the states can continue to require those companies to register their cov-
                                                          
45. See id. Sec. 102(a), § 18(b)(3), 110 Stat. 3416, 3418 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77r (Supp. I 1995-
96)).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (1994).
47. Id. § 77d.
48. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (1997).
49. See Warren, supra note 3, at 518-19.
50. See NSMIA Sec. 307(a), 110 Stat. 3416, 3440 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a note (Supp. I
1995-96)).
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ered securities.51  Accordingly, until October 11, 1999, Congress has authorized
a truly unique offering of preemptive rights.  By pinning a price tag on preemp-
tion, Congress has again contributed to the non-uniformity it purportedly
sought to overcome.
In other parts of the NSMIA, Congress significantly limits the authority of
the states to regulate broker-dealers and investment advisers.  With respect to
broker-dealer regulation, Congress has preempted state laws that impose capi-
tal, margin, reporting, and record-keeping requirements inconsistent with fed-
eral law.52  With respect to investment advisers, Congress has developed a
“dividing the pie” approach, allocating regulatory authority to the states for in-
vestment advisers with less than $25 million under management and to the SEC
for all others.53  In sum, Congress, through the NSMIA, has usurped a huge por-
tion of the states’ police powers, eliminating most of the states’ registration
authority and significantly reducing the states’ role in regulating broker-dealers
and investment advisers.  All of this begs the questions how? and why?, espe-
cially during a period that delivered more capital formation and greater trading
volume than at any other time in our history.  Shortly after the NSMIA’s pas-
sage, SEC Chairman Authur Levitt, while addressing the securities administra-
tors of the fifty states, prophesied “that passage of this bill will end the national
debate on preemption for many years to come.”54  Chairman Levitt’s projection
regarding the prospects for preemption soon proved materially erroneous.  In-
deed, put in their best light, Chairman Levitt’s falsely prophetic remarks were
reminiscent of the high-sounding political rhetoric, continuously expressed
since the beginning of the Reagan Administration, that federal regulatory
power should be decentralized and reduced through a corresponding expansion
of state regulatory power.55
C.  The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Legislation
In less than one year before the 1996 elections, Congress had been per-
suaded both to limit drastically the private federal remedies historically avail-
able to investors to redress corporate misconduct and to obliterate for the most
part the role of state securities administrators in the securities offering process.
The high-tech lobby, fresh off these successes (and also having rebuffed an at-
                                                          
51. See id. Sec. 307(c), 110 Stat. 3416, 3440 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a note (Supp. I 1995-96)).
52. See id. Sec. 103(a), § 78o(h)(1), 110 Stat. 3416, 3420-21 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77o (Supp. I
1995-96)).
53. See id. Sec. 303(a), § 203A, 110 Stat. 3416, 3437 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a (Supp. I 1995-
96)).
54. Arthur Levitt, The SEC and NASAA: Working Together to Protect Investors, Remarks at
Annual Fall Conference of the North American Securities Administrators Association, Salt Lake City,
Utah (Sept.  9, 1996) (transcript on file with author).  Curiously, Chairman Levitt subsequently has en-
dorsed the Gramm bill, noting that “dual standards in state and federal court are wrong.”  SEC Throws
Weight Behind Reform Bill; Levitt Praised at Renomination Hearing, 30 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA)
477 (Mar. 27, 1998).
55. See generally Final Report of SEC Transition Team, [Jan.-June] Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA)
No. 587, at K-1 (Jan. 21, 1981).
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tempt by the plaintiffs’ bar to strengthen investor remedies under California
law56) moved forward to the final phase of its strategic plan.  If expansion of
state remedies could be defeated, why not push for their elimination alto-
gether?  Moreover, if a willing Congress could be persuaded to take the teeth
out of Rule 10b-5 and other express and implied remedies under the federal se-
curities laws, why not convince it, in the name of uniformity, to protect its re-
forms by preempting the common law of fraud and closing the investors’ doors
to state courthouses?  Reorganizing itself as the Uniform Standards Coalition,57
the high-tech lobby once again has come to Washington.  Not surprisingly, the
Coalition already has secured broad-based bipartisan support for legislation
that would preempt state securities fraud laws.  Armed with the Grundfest-
Perino study and its updates, the Coalition has advanced the “substitution ef-
fect” theory, arguing that investors, unable to comply with more stringent
pleading requirements under the Reform Act, were shifting their claims to state
courts and asserting causes of action under state law.58  According to the Coali-
tion, this shift undermines the Reform Act’s purposes to end abusive securities
litigation, sabotages the Reform Act’s safe harbor for disclosure of forward-
looking information, circumvents the Reform Act’s discovery stays, facilitates
frivolous lawsuits, erodes the efficiency of national markets, and imposes exces-
sive legal costs on corporate issuers.59  And, in a significant affront to federal-
ism’s dual sovereignty postulate, the Coalition has stated, “protection against
fraud and other investors’ rights should not vary because of where people
live.”60
Although the statistical evidence of the shift from federal to state court is
far from convincing at this stage, such a shift would make strategic sense given
the Reform Act’s restrictions on federal remedies.  Indeed, one court, in re-
fusing to stay a state securities fraud class action parallel to a federal one on
related claims, has stated that a dual-track litigation strategy is not only permis-
sible but that the Reform Act “effectively compels” parallel filings.61  Certainly
a parallel or stand-alone state securities fraud action would facilitate the inves-
tors’ discovery of facts necessary to sustain the case during the motions phase
                                                          
56. See Proposition 211, 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 211 (West).
57. The Uniform Standards Coalition was formed by the Securities Industry Association, Ameri-
can Electronics Association, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, and the National
Venture Capital Association.  According to their own materials promulgated by the National Associa-
tion of Securities and Commercial Law Attorneys, it was formed in response to the unprecedented rise
in securities class actions in state courts against high-growth companies.  See BACKGROUND MA-
TERIALS: PREEMPTION OF STATE SECURITIES LAWS IN THE 105TH CONGRESS (on file with author).
58. See National Association of Securities and Commercial Law Attorneys, Meritless Securities
Lawsuits: The Abuse Some Lawyers Can’t Live Without, in UNIFORM STANDARDS COALITION
BACKGROUND MATERIALS, PRESS KIT, at 1, 3, 4 (May 6, 1997) (on file with author).
59. See National Association of Securities and Commercial Law Attorneys, Uniform Standards,
Finish the Job: End Abusive Securities Litigation, in UNIFORM STANDARDS COALITION BACKGROUND
MATERIALS, PRESS KIT, at 2 (May 6, 1997) (on file with author).
60. National Association of Securities and Commercial Law Attorneys, supra note 58, at 5.
61. See Calif. Court Finds No Error in Refusal to Stay State Litigation, 29 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) 1214 (Aug. 29, 1997) (discussing Oak Tech. v. Superior Court, No. HO16141 (Calif. Ct. App.,
Aug. 14, 1997)).
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of their case and thus permit a jury determination of the defendant’s liability.
Obviously, if Congress had determined to go one step further and deny de-
frauded investors any private remedy at the federal level, we would be rid of
parallel actions and defrauded investors would have no choice but to pursue
state law remedies in state courts.  Assuming arguendo a shift to state courts,
no study to date offers objective evidence that securities fraud actions filed ei-
ther in state courts or that state causes of action under state law tend to be abu-
sive, frivolous, or destructive of market efficiency.  No evidence indicates that
pleading requirements or discovery rights provided by state courts discriminate
against corporate defendants or have been abused by investor plaintiffs.
Moreover, it is far too early to determine whether these lawsuits have had any
impact on the Reform Act’s safe harbor for forward-looking information.  In-
deed, SEC Chairman Levitt has advised both President Clinton and Congress
that “it is too early to assess with confidence many important effects of the Re-
form Act and . . . premature to propose legislative changes.”62  Not surprisingly,
Commissioner Wallman disagreed, refusing to accept the “fragmentation of our
national system of securities litigation.”63  Of course, under federalism’s dual
regulatory structure we have never had a “national system of securities litiga-
tion.”
In response to the Coalition’s calls for legislation that would preempt inves-
tors’ state law remedies, a number of consumer and government groups have
voiced strong opposition.  The Consumer Federation of America, the Ameri-
can Association of Retired Persons, and the Consumers Union have stated
collectively that Congress should not act until “seeing real, conclusive evidence
of how the litigation reform act has affected the ability of defrauded investors
to recover their losses” and, without that evidence, Congress should not
“support legislative initiatives that would extend this untested experiment to
lawsuits brought under state laws.”64  The Gray Panthers, expressing their op-
position more bluntly, have stated that if the Reform Act “turns out not to pro-
vide adequate protections against fraud—as we fear—state remedies will be all
that older people have left if they are to recover what is stolen from them.”65
Taking a different tack, various government groups, including the National
League of Cities, the U.S. Conference of Mayors, and the Government Finance
Officers Association, have stated that “states must be able to protect state and
                                                          
62. Letter from Arthur Levitt, Chairman of the United States Securities and Exchange Commmis-
sion, to President William J. Clinton (Apr. 15, 1997) (on file with author); see also REFORM ACT
REPORT, supra note 18.
63. Statement of Additional Views of Commissioner Wallman Regarding The Report of the First
Year of Practice under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (Apr. 11, 1997) (on file
with author); see also REFORM ACT REPORT, supra note 18.
64. General Information Letter by Barbara Roper of the Consumer Federation of America and
Betsy Dotson of the Government Finance Officers Association (quoting Letter to President William J.
Clinton from American Association of Retired Persons, Citizens Action, Consumer Federation of
America, Consumers Union, Public Citizen’s Congress Watch, U.S. Public Interest Research Group)
(Aug. 13, 1997) (on file with author).
65. Letter from Tim Fuller, Executive Director, Gray Panthers, to President William J. Clinton
(Sept. 11, 1997) (on file with author).
WARREN.FMT 09/17/98  8:02 AM
180 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 60: No. 3
local government funds and their taxpayers regardless of (or because of) the
obstacles present in federal law,” that “preemption . . . would be contrary to the
principles of federalism,” and that “without meaningful access to state courts
and reasonable remedies, public funds will be at greater risk than ever.”66
Neither the strong opposition from consumer and government groups nor
the note of caution sounded by the SEC seems to have slowed the Coalition’s
objective.  In the spring of 1997, before a single post-Reform Act case had
made its way to a jury, the first of the three state remedy preemption bills, H.R.
1653,67 was introduced by Representative Tom Campbell of California.  This
bill would amend the savings clauses of both the 1933 Act and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 by providing that no private civil action alleging a mis-
representation or omission or use of a manipulative or deceptive device in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of any “covered security”68 may be initiated or
maintained in any state court, or under state law as a pendent claim to an ac-
tion under federal law.69  In addition, the bill would amend the 1933 Act to sub-
stitute exclusive federal jurisdiction for the longstanding concurrent jurisdiction
of state and federal courts.70  The Campbell bill would not only deny defrauded
investors in nationally traded securities all access to state courts, but would for-
bid them from asserting as pendent claims in a federal forum any rights arising
under state securities acts or under the laws of fraud, deceit, negligent and in-
tentional misrepresentation and, conceivably, breach of fiduciary duty and con-
version.  Moreover, the preemption of these claims would eliminate any oppor-
tunity for the recovery of punitive damages and attorney fees available only
under state law.  Significantly, this bill does not distinguish class actions from
individual actions, and, accordingly, precludes both.  And the limitation to
“covered securities” under Section 18(b)(1) of the 1933 Act,71 added by the
NSMIA, effectively immunizes those issuers with securities traded on the
NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ’s National Market System.  The issuers remain-
ing as potential defendants subject to investor claims under state law are pre-
sumably only those companies that publicly offer securities that are traded in
the small capitalization markets or are not traded at all.
Accordingly, it appears that smaller, less capitalized businesses will remain
targeted under state law while larger, better capitalized companies will be
granted immunity from the statutory and common law of the states.  In other
words, what Commissioner Wallman described as our “national system of secu-
rities litigation” remains as fragmented as ever, but, it is fragmented in favor of
                                                          
66. Letter from National League of Cities, National Association of Counties, National Association
of County Treasurers and Finance Officers, Municipal Treasurers’ Association, Government Finance
Officers Association, and U.S. Conference of Mayors to The Honorable Alfonse D’Amato of the
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (July 24, 1997) (on file with author).
67. H.R. 1653, 105th Cong. (1997).
68. Id. Sec. 2(a)(1), § 16(b)(1)(A), (f)(1)(A).
69. See id. Sec. 2(a)(1), § 16 (b)(1)(B), (f)(1)(B).
70. See id. Sec. 2(a)(1), § 16(b), (f).
71. See id. Sec. 102(a)(1), § 16(b)(2), (f)(2).
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nationally traded companies who are placed in an especial class of companies
against which state law claims may not be asserted and punitive damages may
not be assessed.  Under this scenario, the smaller companies’ regulatory bur-
dens would be disproportionately higher with resulting disclosure obligations
developing on separate tracks.  At the same time, both types of issuers would
remain equally subject to state governmental prosecution civilly and criminally
under regulatory regimes that differ markedly from state to state.  It is difficult
to surmise how this bill would promote national uniformity or deter abusive or
frivolous litigation.  The intrusive means that Congress would employ thus bear
less than a rational relationship to the goals it would seek to achieve.
The Campbell bill was quickly followed by another, H.R. 1689,72  introduced
by Representatives Rick White of Washington and Anna Eshoo of California,
with some ninety-five co-sponsors, including Representative Campbell.  This
bill calls for a curious redefinition of class action requirements.  It would rede-
fine class actions to include any single lawsuit or group of lawsuits filed or
pending in the same court involving common questions of law or fact in which
damages are sought on behalf of more than twenty-five persons, where one or
more named parties seeking to recover damages on a representative basis, or
where one or more of the parties did not personally authorize the lawsuit.73  In-
stead of eliminating concurrent jurisdiction generally under the 1933 Act, the
bill would eliminate concurrent jurisdiction only as to class actions preempted
by the bill.74  However, it broadly extends the term “covered security” to all se-
curities of issuers that had “covered securities” of any kind outstanding at the
time of the alleged misconduct, regardless of whether the fraud was in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of those securities.75
The Senate bill, S. 1260,76 introduced on October 7, 1997, by Senators Phil
Gramm of Texas and Chris Dodd of Connecticut, is identical to its House coun-
terpart except for its use of the term “covered security,” which would extend
not to the issuer generally but to securities that are traded on one of the three
designated marketplaces and to securities issued by mutual funds.77  Similar to
the Campbell bill, both the White-Eshoo and Gramm-Dodd bills would create
an especial class of companies immune from fraud claims based on state statu-
tory and common law.  This immunity likely would extend to a broad range of
claims based on breach of fiduciary duty under the common law and breach of
the duties of care and loyalty under state corporation codes.  After all, a sub-
stantial portion of shareholder suits for breach of fiduciary duty, particularly in
connection with proxy fights, tender offers, and mergers, include averments of
material misrepresentations and omissions in connection with the purchase or
sale of a security.  In this context, the legislation could foreclose filing of share-
                                                          
72. H.R. 1689, 105th Cong. (1997).
73. See id. Sec. 2(a)(1), § 16(d)(1)(A)-(C).
74. See id. Sec. 2(a)(2).
75. See id. Sec. 2(a)(1), § 16(d)(2).
76. S. 1260, 105th Cong. (1997).
77. See id. Sec. 2(a)(1), § 16(d)(2).
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holder derivative actions, a special form of class action which generally consti-
tutes the sole remedy of shareholders for breach of duties owed by officers and
directors to the corporations they serve.  According to one prominent observer,
the White-Eshoo and Gramm-Dodd bills would preempt a whole body of state
corporate law and the “uniformity of Delaware state law would be eroded,”
creating a “mess” inimicable to corporate America’s interests.78
The uniform standards legislation would serve no purpose other than a sub-
stantial reduction of liability exposure for corporate misconduct by a favored
group of companies.  In exculpating these companies from state law claims,
these bills would significantly frustrate the conduct monitoring function per-
formed by the private bar in its representation of aggrieved investors.  All of
these proposals would limit access to justice for investors defrauded by nation-
ally traded companies or their leadership by forcing investors to use the proce-
durally and substantively restricted remedies provided at the federal level and
denying those investors the statutory and common law remedies traditionally
afforded by the states.
Obviously, the legislation will do little to promote the ostensible goal of
uniformity.  State administrative agencies and attorney generals would con-
tinue to prosecute, civilly and criminally, fraud-based misconduct in violation of
state law disclosure standards.  Defrauded investors would continue to assert
state law disclosure standards in suits against companies whose securities are
not traded in major marketplaces and differing federal law disclosure standards
against those companies whose securities are traded in those marketplaces.
And, under the White-Eshoo and Gramm-Dodd bills, defrauded investors
would assert differing state and federal disclosure standards in individual ac-
tions and federal disclosure standards in newly defined “class actions.”  Moreo-
ver, because of the likely intrusion into state corporate law that courts have
long refused to federalize,79 the legislation could disrupt the established uni-
formity of state corporate laws that govern both publicly-held and closely-held
corporations.80  Indeed, the proposed uniform standards legislation could create
an unprecedented “mess” of conflicting disclosure standards and conflicting
                                                          
78. Rachel Wilmer, SEC, Private Bar Are Working to Address Alleged Flaw in Pending Legislation
to Reform Securities Litigation, 13 BNA’S CORP. COUNSEL WKLY. 8 (Feb. 4, 1998).
79. In Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), the Supreme Court expressed its reluctance
“to federalize the substantial portion of the law of corporations that deals with transactions in securi-
ties, particularly where established state policies of corporate regulation would be overridden.”  Id. at
479.  Indeed, the English Crown’s power over corporations devolved directly to the people, and, hence,
to the states at the time of the revolution.  See Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S.
518, 651 (4 Wheat.) (1819).  As Justice Powell stated more recently, “no principle of corporation law
and practice is more firmly established than a [s]tate’s authority to regulate domestic corporations.”
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987).
80. The Delaware General Corporation Law and the American Bar Association’s widely adopted
Revised Model Business Corporation Act, as interpreted and applied by state courts, have established
a body of comparable principles among the states that apply regardless of a given corporation’s size or
marketplace status.  For a history of the evolution of modern general corporation statutes, see JAMES
D. COX ET AL., CORPORATIONS 29-37 (1997).
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remedies within and between the established complementary regimes of federal
and state law developed for the protection of investors and their marketplace.
The proposed legislation has no rational basis, either in promoting nation-
wide uniform disclosure standards or in preventing abusive or frivolous litiga-
tion.  No one has presented persuasive evidence that investors generally have
behaved frivolously or abusively in asserting securities fraud claims against
corporate issuers or that the assertion of claims and remedies traditionally af-
forded under state law has seriously frustrated congressional purposes.  In-
stead, as SEC Commissioner Norman Johnson has concluded, the controversy
underlying the legislation “appears to be driven by anecdotes and ideology
rather than hard facts.”81  Moreover, it is doubtful that Congress has the requi-
site power to enact any of these three legislative proposals.  Its proposed pre-
emption of state remedies not only lacks a rational basis in promoting the goals
sought to be achieved, but also lacks persuasive proof of substantial and com-
mercial effects on interstate commerce.  Before preempting state law and state
remedies, Congress must consider essential postulates of federalism that define
the limits of its delegated commerce power and the residuum of power retained
by the states.
At this juncture, it is difficult to predict the fate of the proposed uniform
standards legislation.82  Clearly, each of the three versions introduced raises se-
rious questions as to whether congressional power under the Commerce Clause
is sufficiently extensive to divest securities investors of all protection under the
statutory and common law of the states.  Without that power, of course, Con-
gress cannot preempt the states.  Assuming arguendo that the proposed or
similar legislation is enacted, it is unlikely to survive constitutional challenge.
The balance of this article focuses on the presumed challenge and the prob-
ability that the essential postulates of federalism pretermits congressional use
of the commerce power to eliminate the powers of the states to provide non-
discriminatory remedies to investors.
III
JUDICIAL DELINEATION OF “ACTIVE” AND DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
POWERS
A.  Constitutional Limits on Congressional Commerce Power
The proposed uniform standards legislation involves the takeover of the
people’s centuries-old common law remedies, statutory remedies under blue
sky laws that long preceded the federal securities statutes, and remedies for
                                                          
81. Testimony of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Before the Subcommittee on Se-
curities, Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate 23 n.35 (Oct. 29, 1997) (on
file with author).
82. Senator Gramm recently has predicted that his version of the legislation, S. 1260, will pass the
Senate and possibly the House.  See Gramm Predicts Passage of Bill to Federalize Securities Class Suits,
30 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 321 (Feb. 27, 1998).
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breach of fiduciary duty well established under state corporate law.  This strike
at the heart of state power presents a critical challenge to the constitutional
federalism that arose from the people’s ceding of certain power to the federal
government while retaining the residuum for themselves and their respective
states.  If Congress can proceed freely at the behest of a heavily financed lobby
to pare away the protections afforded by the common law, by our state judici-
aries, and by our state legislatures, whatever is left of the federalist structure
undergirding our Constitution comes close to collapse.  Admittedly, limits
seemed to have been lost as New Deal legislation gradually overcame Com-
merce Clause restrictions evident in cases like Hammer v. Dagenhart,83 a World
War I decision in which the Supreme Court, recognizing that federalism re-
quired a narrow interpretation of congressional commerce power, held that the
manufacture of goods was not commerce.84  By World War II, the Supreme
Court had changed course and, in United States v. Darby,85 overruled Hammer.
Then, in the 1950s and 1960s, the commerce power was further liberalized
through judicial support of a well-meaning Congress in the valiant effort to pro-
tect the civil rights of our minorities.  To assert the rights of the states became
heresy and federalism became the refuge of racists.  The great national strug-
gles demanded by both the Depression and the civil rights movement tested the
limits of core constitutional principles like federalism and the dual sovereignty
it established.  Unfortunately, Congress has grown accustomed to its post-
Depression powers and, with considerable judicial support, has come to believe
that life itself is interstate commerce and that it can use commerce power to re-
shape or reconfigure the role of the states in any way it so desires.
However, despite decades of liberal interpretation by the Supreme Court,
limits to that power do exist.  It has been well established that for Congress to
act legitimately under its enumerated Commerce Clause power, the subject
matter Congress seeks to regulate must “substantially affect” interstate com-
merce.86  If no “substantial” and “commercial effect” is shown, Congress has no
power to act and, accordingly, has no Supremacy Clause protection and no pre-
emptive power over the states.  In recent years, the Supreme Court, giving long
overdue recognition to our federalist structure, has begun to reinvigorate the
definitive limits of congressional power under the Commerce Clause.
The origins of the modern debate over the limitations imposed on congres-
sional authority by the essential postulates of federalism may be traced in part
to the Supreme Court’s decision in National League of Cities v. Usery.87  In an
                                                          
83. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
84. See id. at 271-72.  The Court held that Congress had no Commerce Clause power to enact child
labor laws prohibiting transportation of child-made goods in interstate commerce.  See id. at 276.  The
Court feared that if it permitted such an intrusion into matters of local concern, “all freedom of com-
merce will be at an end, and the power of the States over local matters may be eliminated, and thus our
system of government be practically destroyed.”  Id. at 276.
85. 312 U.S. 100, 117 (1941).
86. See Lopez v. United States, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995).
87. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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opinion by Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court revived state sovereignty as
an independent limitation on congressional commerce power.  The Court held
that the Fair Labor Standards Act, as applied to regulate the wages and hours
paid by the states to their employees, exceeded congressional authority under
the Commerce Clause.88  Congress simply could not, under the guise of the
Commerce Clause, “displace the States’ freedom to structure integral opera-
tions in areas of traditional governmental functions.”89  Congressional determi-
nation of wages paid by the states to employees discharging those functions in-
truded upon an essential “attribute of state sovereignty.”90  In his concurring
opinion, Justice Blackmun expressed his view that federal commerce power
should be preserved only where an overriding federal interest could be shown,
suggesting, in effect, a strict scrutiny standard of review rather than the rational
basis standard generally applied where the essential attributes of state sover-
eignty are not directly implicated.91
Subsequently, in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Asso-
ciation,92 the Court refused to expand National League of Cities to limit con-
gressional regulation of private activities traditionally within the realm of the
states’ police powers.  Instead, it stated that the principles underlying National
League of Cities must be confined to intrusions upon state sovereignty where
state actors act as states, and not where the federal regulation applies to indi-
viduals.93  Justice Rehnquist concurred in the Court’s judgment that the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act did not violate the Commerce Clause,
but he disagreed with any suggestion that “the federal system exists only at the
sufferance of Congress.”94  Chief Justice Rehnquist enthusiastically reaffirmed
the principle that dual sovereignty inherent in the Constitution more generally
imposes constitutional limits on the scope of the congressional commerce
power.95
The Court reversed course in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority,96  and overruled National League of Cities.  In his majority opinion,
Justice Blackmun, reversing his own stand in National League of Cities, deter-
mined that defining the states’ traditional governmental functions under Na-
tional League of Cities was too onerous a task.  He expressed frustration over
what he termed a failure “to identify an organizing principle” that would prop-
erly define the limits of congressional commerce power vis á vis the states.97  In
                                                          
88. See id. at 852.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 845.
91. See id. at 856.  According to Justice Blackmun, the Court adopted “a balancing approach” that
would not proscribe congressional power “where the federal interest is demonstratably greater” than
state interest.  Id.
92. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
93. See id. at 286-88.
94. Id. at 308.
95. See id. at 309-10.
96. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
97. Id. at 539.
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the majority’s view, state sovereignty concerns could be better protected by the
political process itself—through elected legislative representatives—than by
stand-alone principles of federalism.98  The Court did not question the central
theme of National League of Cities that the position of the states in our federal
structure limits the scope of congressional authority under the Commerce
Clause, or that essential “postulates” of federalism, behind the words of the
Constitution, limit and control congressional power and protect the essentials
of state sovereignty.  Instead, the Court simply abdicated and assigned its judi-
cial function to the legislative branch.  The Court stated that “we have no li-
cense to employ freestanding conceptions of state sovereignty when measuring
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause,”99 and that state sover-
eign interests are protected more properly by “the effectiveness of the federal
political process.”100
While the majority’s opinion in Garcia hardly advanced the cause of feder-
alism, the passionate dissent can only be described as its manifesto and as a
harbinger of its resurrection.  In a scathing dissent, joined by Chief Justice Bur-
ger and Justices Rehnquist and O’Connor, Justice Powell stated that the ma-
jority decision “substantially alters the federal system embodied in the Consti-
tution,”101 it “effectively reduces the Tenth Amendment to meaningless rhetoric
when Congress acts pursuant to the Commerce Clause,”102 and “an unelected
majority of five Justices . . . today rejects almost 200 years of the understanding
of the constitutional status of federalism.”103  The dissent was particularly of-
fended by the majority’s naive understanding of the federal political process
and the factual premises that have compromised that process’s purported role
as the guardian of state concerns.  The dissent identified a number of factors,
including, among others, the rise of national media and the weakening of politi-
cal parties at the local level, that “have made Congress increasingly less repre-
sentative of state and local interests, and more likely to be responsive to the
demands of various national constituencies.”104  The dissent pointed to the in-
crease in recent years of sophisticated lobbying by special interest groups that
make substantial campaign contributions to members of Congress, concluding
that, contrary to the majority’s view, “a ‘political process’ that functions in this
way is unlikely to safeguard the sovereign rights of  States.”105  In the dissent’s
view, these sovereign rights of the states have been constitutionally enshrined
by the Tenth Amendment, which is “an essential part of the Bill of Rights,”106
and these rights are no more protected by the political process than the rights
                                                          
98. See id. at 552.
99. Id. at 550.
100. Id. at 552.
101. Id. at 557.
102. Id. at 560.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 565 n.9.
105. Id. at 575 n.18.
106. See id. at 565 n.8.
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to free speech, representation by counsel, judicial redress of grievances, and
due process of law.107  Indeed, inclusion of the Bill of Rights and its provision
affirming the residual powers of the states was critical to the positive vote on
ratification.108  Certainly, the dissent emphasized, members of Congress should
not be permitted to serve as the arbiters of the rights retained by the states or
as the sole judges of the limits of their own power under the Commerce Clause.
After all, Justice Powell stated, “the [s]tates’ role in our system of government
is a matter of constitutional law, not of legislative grace.”109
The dissenting Justices in Garcia focused extensively on the views of the
Constitution’s framers in their division of authority between the federal and
state governments, including Madison’s elaboration in the Federalist No. 45:
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the Federal Government, are
few and defined.  Those which are to remain in the State Governments are numerous
and indefinite.  The former will be exercised principally on external objects, as war,
peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce. . . . The powers reserved to the several
[s]tates will extend to all the objects, which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern
the lives, liberties and properties of the people; and the internal order, improvement,
and prosperity of the [s]tate.110
Additionally, they reiterated Hamilton’s views, as reflected in the Federalist
No. 17, that the States “regulat[e] all those personal interests and familiar con-
cerns to which the sensibility of individuals is more immediately awake,” that
people perceived the states as “the immediate and visible guardian of life and
property,” and that this contributed “more than any other circumstance” to the
people’s respect for and loyalty to the government.111  According to the Garcia
dissent, “by usurping functions traditionally performed by the States, federal
overreaching under the Commerce Clause undermines the constitutionally
mandated balance of power between the States and the [f]ederal [g]overnment,
a balance designed to protect our fundamental liberties.”112  The dissent noted
that the constitutional debates clearly demonstrated that the power granted to
Congress under the Commerce Clause only extends to commerce that the
states lacked the practical capacity to regulate, a postulate implicit in its lan-
guage, “[t]o regulate [c]ommerce with foreign [n]ations, and among the several
[s]tates, and with the Indian [t]ribes.”113 Congressional commerce power, ac-
cordingly, is exceptional, limited to the incapabilities of the states,114 and all
other commerce power, indeed, “nearly the whole charge of interior regula-
tion,”115 remains with the states and the people since it is not expressly dele-
gated to the federal government.
                                                          
107. See id.
108. Id. at 568.
109. Id. at 567.
110. Id. at 570-71 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961)).
111. Id. at 571 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 17 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961)).
112. Id. at 572.
113. Id. at 572 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3).
114. See id. at 572.
115. Id. at 573 (quoting Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71 (1869)).
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In concluding his Garcia dissent, Justice Powell, in search of the elusive
“organizing principle,” argued for application of a balancing test that would
allow federal intrusion only where the federal interest is demonstrably greater
than the interests of the states.116  In a separate dissent, Justice O’Connor ex-
pressed her view that the balancing test should weigh state autonomy as a fac-
tor in determining the limits of congressional Commerce Clause power to
regulate states as states.117  In his own brief dissent, Justice Rehnquist refused to
commit to the balancing tests proposed by Justices Powell and O’Connor, not-
ing that National League of Cities recognized that Congress had no commerce
power at all to infringe on fundamental aspects of state sovereignty essential to
the states’ separate and independent existence.118  He simply concluded by ex-
pressing confidence that the principles underlying National League of Cities
would “in time again command the support of a majority of this Court.”119
Justice Rehnquist did not get the first opportunity to undo the damage to
federalism he believed was done by the majority in Garcia.  This fell to Justice
O’Connor, who, in two significant opinions, rejected the notion that the politi-
cal process was a sufficient safeguard for state sovereignty.  In the first, Greg-
ory v. Ashcroft,120 she began by stating, “As every schoolchild learns, our Con-
stitution establishes a system of dual sovereignty between the [s]tates and the
[f]ederal [g]overnment.”121  She outlined the numerous advantages of “a feder-
alist structure of joint sovereigns.”122  She identified as the most important of
these its ability to prevent the accumulation of excessive power by either, ac-
complishing the “double security” described by Madison in the Federalist No.
51 that reduces the risk of tyranny and abuse.123  In a decision the dissenters
claimed directly contravened Garcia,124 the majority held that congressional
commerce power as exercised in its Age Discrimination in Employment Act
could not compel the age qualifications of Missouri’s state judges.125
Similarly, in New York v. United States,126 Justice O’Connor, again writing
for the majority, struck down provisions of Congress’s Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Act, which compelled the states to either “take title” to waste
generated within their borders or to regulate pursuant to congressional instruc-
tions.  In this decision, Justice O’Connor noted two related approaches to set-
ting the limits of state and federal power under the Constitution.  The first is
whether Congress has acted pursuant to a power delegated to it by the Consti-
                                                          
116. See id. at 562 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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118. See id. at 579-80.
119. Id. at 580.
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126. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).  See generally Thomas W. Kelty, Federalism: While the Stewards Slept . . .
New York v. United States, 29 URB. LAW. 529 (1997).
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tution, the second, whether Congress has acted in a way that usurps the powers
reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment.127  Both inquiries, Justice
O’Connor stated, are but “mirror images of each other,”128 for if power is dele-
gated to Congress in the Constitution, the Tenth Amendment disclaims it, and
if power is an attribute of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment,
it is not a power delegated to Congress.  In this case, the Court held that the
Constitution simply did not confer upon Congress the ability to compel the
states to regulate in a particular field, to require the states to govern according
to congressional instructions, or to otherwise commandeer the states to imple-
ment federal regulatory policies.129  In doing so, however, the Court stated that
while Congress cannot regulate the states’ regulation of interstate commerce, it
can regulate directly and thus preempt the states by virtue of the Supremacy
Clause.130  Again, the Court touted federalism without fully linking it to the
Commerce Clause.
The principles addressed by Justice O’Connor writing for the majority in
Gregory and New York were again reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in the
summer of 1997, in Printz v. United States.131  In an opinion written by Justice
Scalia, the Court, asserting stand-alone postulates of federalism, invalidated
provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act that required state
law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on handgun purchas-
ers.  According to the majority, the federal government, under the purported
exercise of Commerce Clause powers and the supplemental Necessary and
Proper Clause, “may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal
regulatory program.”132  Moreover, because the legislation seeks “to direct the
functioning of the state executive, and hence to compromise the structural
framework of dual sovereignty,” it would be inappropriate to apply a balancing
test that would weigh asserted federal interests against those of the states.133
This may explain why Justice Rehnquist, in his cryptic Garcia dissent, refused
to commit to any balancing test.  According to Justice Scalia, “it is the very
principle of separate state sovereignty that such a law offends, and no compara-
tive assessment of the various interests can overcome that fundamental de-
fect.”134  Further elaborating on this principle, Justice Scalia observed that the
courts have traditionally invalidated legislation that has deviated from the form
of government the Constitution established as its primary concern.135  Quoting
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language from Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion in New York v. United
States, he stated that “the Constitution protects us from our own best inten-
tions:  It divides power among sovereigns and among branches of government
precisely so that we may resist the temptation to concentrate power in one loca-
tion as an expedient solution to the crisis of the day.”136  Thus, the Court effec-
tively reversed Justice Blackmun’s majority opinion in Garcia that
“freestanding conceptions of state sovereignty cannot be employed to limit
[c]ongressional authority under the Commerce Clause.”  According to Printz,
they can and they do.
Two years before the Printz case, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s turn to speak
finally came in Lopez v. United States,137 in which he fulfilled his own Garcia
prophecy.  Now Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices O’Connor, Scalia,
Kennedy, and Thomas, rejected on Commerce Clause grounds the Gun-Free
School Zones Act, which prohibited possession of firearms in a school zone.138
He began by emphasizing that dual sovereignty defines the outer limits of con-
gressional commerce power, and congressional power cannot be used to oblit-
erate the distinction between what is national and what is local, so as to create a
completely centralized government.139  Congress only has commerce power to
regulate the use of channels of interstate commerce and their instrumentalities,
persons, and property moving in interstate commerce, and activities having a
substantial relation to interstate commerce.140  The majority held that the
criminal statute at issue did not fall within any of these three categories.141  In
fact, according to Chief Justice Rehnquist, the challenged law had nothing to
do with “commerce.”142  The majority dismissed the government’s argument
that the cost of crime and its effect on national productivity provided the requi-
site commercial nexus, for if accepted, Congress would be enabled to regulate
anything.143  Furthermore, the Constitution does not grant Congress a plenary
police power.144  Thus, unless it can be demonstrated that the regulated activity
has a substantial effect on interstate commerce,145 the law cannot be sustained
to regulate either state or private activities.146
In Chief Justice Rehnquist’s view, the court’s elusive “organizing principle”
did not involve any balancing of the relative interests of Congress and those of
the states.  Instead, it must be built on the core postulate that the people
granted Congress power over interstate commerce limited to the regulation of
activities that have a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce, as op-
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posed to activities having indirect or insubstantial effects.147  He acknowledged
the Court’s prior holdings limiting the states’ retained commerce powers to
regulation that did not discriminate against interstate commerce.148  Thus, with
the exception of congressional power to regulate “economic activity [that] sub-
stantially affects interstate commerce,”149 the states, under our federalist struc-
ture, retain all other commerce powers together with this plenary police pow-
ers, unless their exercise would be discriminatory or excessively burdensome on
interstate commerce.150  Chief Justice Rehnquist conceded the imprecision of
his formulation and the necessary elasticity of the limits on congressional com-
merce power.151  Nevertheless, he contended, federalism demands “a distinction
between what is truly national and what is truly local,”152 and does not permit
conversion of “congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a gen-
eral police power of the sort retained by the [s]tates.”153
In his separate Lopez concurrence, Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice
O’Connor, confirmed the significance of the various structural elements of the
Constitution, including federalism, separation of powers, checks and balances,
and judicial review.154  Among these elements, federalism was “the unique con-
tribution of the Framers to political science.”155  Adhering to Madison’s
“double security” principle, Justice Kennedy warned that to allow Congress to
take over areas of traditional state concern would blur the lines “between the
spheres of federal and state authority” and render political responsibility
“illusory.”156  Justice Kennedy reasoned that just as the Court has limited the
power of the states under the dormant Commerce Clause, it must also deter-
mine the limits of congressional power under the Commerce Clause where its
exercise would intrude upon an area of traditional state concern.157  Although
the challenged statute did not commandeer or direct the states to regulate in an
instructed way, as in New York v. United States, the congressional intrusion
upon state powers was nevertheless a fatal constitutional flaw.
In his own concurring opinion, Justice Thomas expressed continued frustra-
tion with the court’s failure to develop a more precise “organizing principle”
for the delineation of congressional commerce power.  He urged reconsidera-
tion by the Court of its substantial effects test and the construction of a more
coherent test to divide commerce power between Congress and the states.  In
his view, the substantial effects on interstate commerce standard was far too
broad as a result of Court’s “wrong turn” in the 1930s from a century and a half
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of precedent.158  The Commerce Clause, after all, was never intended to grant
police powers to Congress, but rather to regulate directly interstate economic
activities.
B.  Constitutional Limits on State Commerce Power
Analysis of the limits on congressional commerce power, as suggested by
Justice Kennedy in his Lopez concurrence, necessarily requires consideration
of limits imposed on the commerce powers of the states.  As Justice O’Connor
explained in New York v. United States, the power constitutionally delegated to
Congress is not reserved to the states, and the powers reserved to the states
have not been delegated to Congress by the Constitution.  To determine
whether her “mirror images” metaphor is functional, one must compare both
images.  Under our federalist structure, the states possess all powers not dele-
gated to the federal government by the Constitution, as affirmed by the Tenth
Amendment’s inclusion in the Bill of Rights.  Consequently, the states have
power over all subject areas that do not substantially affect interstate com-
merce.  Moreover, since the country’s beginnings, the states possessed plenary
police powers, which include the power to regulate commerce in order to pro-
tect the health, morals, and well-being of their citizens.159  The Supreme Court
has held that the states possess power, derivative of their plenary police pow-
ers, to regulate interstate commerce, at least in areas where Congress has re-
mained silent (or has exceeded its own power under the Commerce Clause).160
In prescribing limits on this concurrent power of the states, the Court has
held that the so-called “dormant” Commerce Clause, by negative implication,
generally forbids state legislation that would discriminate against interstate
commerce or would otherwise impose an excessive burden on interstate com-
merce.161  The Court has repeatedly declared that the guiding principle behind
the dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence is the prevention of “economic
protectionism” by the individual states.162  Thus, whenever state legislation in
pursuit of police power objectives is found discriminatory, the Court has ap-
plied a “strict scrutiny” standard of review.  In other words, the Court will
strictly scrutinize the purported objectives of the state police power exercised
and the availability of less restrictive alternatives.163  In cases where the state’s
legislation is even-handed or nondiscriminatory in its application to interstate
commerce, the Court has applied an ad hoc balancing test to determine
whether the legislation imposes an excessive burden on interstate commerce.
In determining excessiveness, the Court weighs the regulatory interests of the
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state under its police powers against the legislation’s actual effect on the flow of
interstate commerce.  In applying this balancing test, the Court has assigned the
greatest weight to state regulatory interests that fall within traditional police
power concerns, including, among others, the prevention of fraud and unfair
business practices.
Nowhere has this been more evident than where states have used their po-
lice powers to protect their citizens against securities fraud.  The Supreme
Court consistently has rejected Commerce Clause challenges to state blue sky
laws since shortly after they were first enacted.  In the three Blue Sky Cases164
in 1917, constitutional assaults were leveled at the securities laws then in effect
in the states of Ohio, South Dakota, and Michigan.  In the first of these cases,
Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co.,165 the challengers were an Ohio corporation acting as
a broker-dealer in numerous states, two individual traders, and a West Virginia
corporation with its principal place of business in Ohio.  They alleged, among
other theories, that the Ohio statute, which gave the state commissioner the
power to revoke securities licenses of dealers and issuers engaging or about to
engage in fraudulent transactions, imposed an excessive burden on interstate
commerce.  In framing the issue as “an asserted conflict between national
power and state power,”166 the Supreme Court found that the statute was a
valid exercise of the state’s police power, describing this power as “the least
limitable of the exercises of government”167 and reaffirming “the principle of
the power of the states to prevent frauds and impositions.”168  After weighing
the state’s regulatory interests, it then assessed the state law’s effects on inter-
state commerce.  While the law required filing of information by companies is-
suing securities in other states, the law’s primary impact was realized only when
disposition of securities was to be made within the state.169  The Court held that
the Ohio blue sky law affected interstate commerce only incidentally and thus
did not constitute an impermissible burden on interstate commerce.170  The
Court reached similar conclusions in the other two Blue Sky Cases, Caldwell v.
Sioux Falls Stock Yards Co.,171 and Merrick v. N.W. Halsey & Co.172  In Merrick,
the Court noted that the Michigan blue sky law “burdens honest business, it is
true, but burdens it only that under its forms dishonest business may not be
done,” and that while expense and inconvenience may be caused, this does not
arrest the power of the states, for “it costs something to be governed.”173  Al-
though these cases preceded the enactment of the federal securities laws, they
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have been consistently applied to reaffirm state securities laws as “a well[-]rec-
ognized exercise of the police power of the States.”174
More recently, the Supreme Court, in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of
America,175 was presented with a Commerce Clause challenge to an Indiana law
protecting its domestic corporations and their shareholders in the context of
hostile corporate stock tender offers.  In upholding the Indiana statute under
the dormant Commerce Clause, the Court began by noting that “the principal
objects of dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny are statutes that discriminate
against interstate commerce.”176  The Indiana law, the Court observed, had the
same effects on securities offerors in-state and out-of-state, and thus was non-
discriminatory.177  The Court then focused extensively on the traditional role of
the states in the field of corporate organization, securities creation, and corpo-
rate governance.  It underscored the significance for Commerce Clause analysis
of the truism that the existence and attributes of the corporate entity are prod-
ucts of state law and that these laws necessarily affect interstate commerce.178
Concluding that the Indiana statute did not offend the Commerce Clause, de-
spite its effects on interstate commerce, the Court observed:
Large corporations that are listed on national exchanges, or even regional exchanges,
will have shareholders in many States and shares that are traded frequently.  The
markets that facilitate this national and international participation in ownership of
corporations are essential for providing capital not only for new enterprises but also
for established companies that need to expand their businesses.  This beneficial free
market system depends at its core upon the fact that a corporation  . . . is organized un-
der, and governed by, the law of a single jurisdiction, traditionally the corporate law of
the [s]tate of its incorporation. . . .179
It is thus an accepted part of the business landscape in this country for states to create
corporations, to prescribe their powers, and to define the rights that are acquired by
purchasing their shares.  A [s]tate has an interest in promoting stable relationships
among parties involved in the corporations it charters, as well as in ensuring that in-
vestors in such corporations have an effective voice in corporate affairs. . . .180
We have rejected the “notion that the Commerce Clause protects the particular struc-
ture or methods of operation in a . . . market.” [citation omitted]  The very commodity
that is traded in the securities market is one whose characteristics are defined by state
law. . . .181
To the limited extent that the Act affects interstate commerce, this is justified by the
[s]tate’s interests in defining the attributes of shares in its corporations and in pro-
tecting shareholders.182
In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia stated, “as long as a State’s corpo-
ration law . . . does not discriminate against out-of-state interests, it should sur-
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vive this Court’s scrutiny under the Commerce Clause, whether it promotes
shareholder welfare or industrial stagnation.”183  In other words, regardless of
whether one agrees with the benefits or the burdens federalism may produce, it
mandates strict protection of state power.  Justice Scalia noted further that the
states have “sacrosanct authority,” both in structuring  domestic corporations
and in their enactment of blue sky laws, including investor remedies, to protect
buyers and sellers of those corporations’ securities.184  In CTS Corp., the Court
understood that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to slice away the securi-
ties aspect of corporate law when the securities themselves are the corporate
pieces that form the whole.  Accordingly, prevention of fraud and making
remedies available to defrauded securities investors are inherent in state regu-
lation of corporations and among the most significant of the states’ traditional
police power concerns.
The dormant Commerce Clause cases illustrate the breadth of commerce
and police powers retained by the states under the Constitution. They offer
useful guidance in determining constitutionally protected local domains for
state governance frequently referred to as either essential attributes of state
sovereignty or as areas of traditional state concern. Because congressional
commerce power is exceptional in nature, geared to the incorporations of the
states and extending only to economic activities that substantially affect inter-
state commerce, the residual powers of the states should be broadly construed
to delineate congressional authority under the Commerce Clause, the exercise
of which would otherwise preempt the states from the exercise of their own
plenary powers.  Justice Rehnquist implicitly adopted this approach in Lopez,
when he simply barred Congress from intruding into matters of local concern,
refusing even to balance federal interests against state interests.  In Lopez,
state power was found sacrosanct.  However, as Justice Thomas stated in his
Lopez concurrence, a more coherent test for determining the limits of congres-
sional commerce power is critically necessary.  This lack of coherence has re-
sulted from a certain “mushiness” in defining the residuum of state power that
was delegated to Congress by the Commerce Clause.  Although Lopez initiated
a return to “hardened” stand-alone postulates of federalism that pretermit
Congress from defining its own commerce power, these postulates have not
risen to the level of the long-sought after “organizing principle” and have not
yet produced a sufficiently coherent test against which congressional use of its
commerce power might be measured.  The coherency objective could be ad-
vanced significantly by a closer examination of the functional relationship be-
tween “active” and “dormant” Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
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IV
THE APPROPRIATE ALLOCATION OF REGULATORY POWER OVER
INTERSTATE COMMERCE
A.  Symmetrical Analysis of the Commerce Clause
The essential postulates of federalism, as amplified by the Supreme Court
in Lopez and other active Commerce Clause cases, as well as in CTS Corp. and
other dormant Commerce Clause cases, underscore the necessity for strength-
ening the linkage between the ambits of both federal and state power under the
Commerce Clause.  Justice Kennedy suggested this approach in his Lopez con-
currence, as Justice O’Connor had done in her New York v. United States dis-
cussion of the “mirror images” of powers delegated and powers retained.  The
vitality of federalism largely depends on the symmetrical interrelationship be-
tween active and dormant Commerce Clause doctrines.  The failure to develop
this symmetry has generated an often confused and inconsistent jurisprudence.
Traditionally, the limits of state commerce power established by dormant
Commerce Clause interpretation have been applied only in the context of con-
gressional silence, or where Congress has not acted validly under its Commerce
Clause power in a manner that would invoke the Supremacy Clause to preempt
the states from exercising their concurrent power.  However, the relevance of
dormant Commerce Clause principles lies within their implicit recognition of
the role of the states in our federalist structure.  The states, not the federal gov-
ernment, hold the residuum of power under the Constitution.  Thus, it is more
than plausible that the reach of the states’ commerce power should properly
define the limits of federal commerce power, and not the converse.  This would
provide the missing link between the federalism guaranteed by our Constitu-
tion and the exercise of commerce power granted to the federal legislature.185
In other words, the Constitution did not grant plenary police powers to the fed-
eral government.  Instead, these powers were reserved to the states.  Thus, any
usurpation of these powers by the federal government should be as strictly con-
strued as state legislation that discriminates against interstate commerce in fa-
vor of its own.  Because the states’ plenary police powers necessarily and ap-
proximately affect commerce, subject to dormant Commerce Clause
prohibitions against discrimination and excessive burdens upon interstate
commerce, the states’ power exercised within those limits should generally
foreclose usurpation by Congress under the Commerce Clause.  If the states
have observed these limits, they have not invaded but, rather, have actually de-
fined the limits of congressional power under the Commerce Clause.  Congres-
sional power is thus unfettered by state power over commerce since the state’s
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valid exercise of its power does not discriminate or excessively burden the in-
terstate commerce that Congress was authorized to regulate.
Consequently, the essential postulates of federalism, indeed, the very struc-
tural assumptions giving rise to dual sovereignty, are fully served by the bal-
ance of state and federal power achieved.  Federalist principles would be firmly
linked to congressional power under the Commerce Clause and the Supremacy
Clause that protects its exercise.  State sovereignty would no longer be victim-
ized as Native Americans were by continual federal encroachment.  The Com-
merce Clause would no longer be the vehicle for carving away state power by
congressional whim.  Under this approach, due respect would be accorded the
states as holders of the residual power instead of the reverse.  A state’s proper
exercise of its concurrent commerce power derivative of its police powers or
otherwise, absent discrimination or imposition of an excessive burden, would
establish a presumption that conflicting federal legislation exceeds the limits of
Congress’s Commerce Clause power.  Under these circumstances, Congress’s
power under the Commerce Clause would be insufficient to override the states,
because that power was simply never delegated by the people to the federal
legislative branch.  This presumption could be overcome only through applica-
tion of a strict scrutiny standard of review, similar to that applied to discrimina-
tory state legislation in the dormant Commerce Clause cases.  Accordingly, the
exercise of federal commerce power would be authorized only where it can be
demonstrated that Congress, in regulating activities shown to have substantial
economic effects on interstate commerce, had a compelling federal interest that
could not be achieved by less restrictive means.  The battlefield for the federal-
state conflict is thus squarely placed in the Commerce Clause and not in the
Supremacy Clause arena where the states can never be victorious.
B.  The Constitutionality of Congressional Preemption of State Securities
Fraud Remedies
Under the proposed uniform standards legislation, as previously described,
Congress in the exercise of purported Commerce Clause power, would preempt
statutory and common law remedies adopted by the states, either through their
respective constitutions, their legislation, or judicial development.  Rather than
prescribing the states’ regulatory course as forbidden in Printz, Congress would
simply proscribe the state’s regulatory course by vetoing either a securities
regulatory scheme or independently developed rules of law protecting the
states’ citizens against fraudulent business practices.  In analyzing the constitu-
tionality of the proposed legislation, two approaches should be considered.
The first approach, relying on traditional Commerce Clause jurisprudence, as
amplified by the recent Supreme Court opinions previously discussed, would
focus on the express limiting language of the Commerce Clause itself as the
primary restraint on congressional power.  In other words, the people’s delega-
tion of power to Congress was limited to the regulation of activities that have
substantial economic effects on interstate commerce.  The second approach,
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relying on a symmetrical analysis of the respective commerce powers of both
federal and state sovereignties, would focus on the reserved power of the states
as the primary restraint on congressional power. Under either approach, the
proposed uniform standards legislation would fail as ultra vires under the Con-
stitution.
Under the traditional approach, the essential query is whether the proposed
legislation seeks to regulate activities having substantial economic effects on in-
terstate commerce.  If it cannot be shown, through congressional findings or
otherwise, that Congress had a rational basis for concluding that the regulated
activities had the requisite commercial impact on interstate commerce, the leg-
islation would be beyond the power of Congress, and, accordingly, an unconsti-
tutional usurpation of the powers retained by the people and their respective
states.  The proposed uniform standards legislation does not purport to regu-
late the interstate distribution or disposition of securities.  Instead, the legisla-
tion seeks to regulate state-law based litigation by eliminating a wide array of
state law claims and remedies.  According to its proponents, the legislation is
designed to create an exclusively federal system of securities litigation for na-
tionally traded companies, a system in which only federal remedies could be as-
serted in federal courts and in which no federal or state remedies could be as-
serted in state courts.  Thus, the activities Congress seeks to regulate are those
of state legislatures in their enactment of statutory private civil remedies for
fraud and breach of fiduciary duty, of state judiciaries in their development of
similar common law remedies, and of private citizens seeking to recover their
investment losses through assertion of those statutory and common law reme-
dies.  These fraud-related remedies granted by the states and asserted by inves-
tors are by their nature activated after the fact of the commercial transactions
giving rise to their assertion.  While these remedies may have incidental regula-
tory effects, they do not regulate commerce but, rather, accomplish the entirely
separate function of compensating victims of fraud.186  These remedies involve
remedial activities in judicial forums and not commercial activities in the eco-
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at 536 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part).  Furthermore, “tort law has an entirely separate function—
compensating victims—that sets it apart from direct forms of regulation.”  Id. at 537 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part).  He observed, “It has declined . . . to find the regulatory effects of state tort law
direct or substantial enough to warrant pre-emption.”  Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part); see, e.g.,
English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72 (1990); Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174
(1988); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984).  In each of these cases, Justice Blackmun
thought that despite the potential consequence of defendants altering their future behavior, the inci-
dental regulatory effects of private damages awards were not “direct or substantial enough to warrant
pre-emption.” Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 537-38 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part).  Moreover, the Su-
preme Court has recognized that a person’s right of access to the courts is an important aspect of the
First Amendment’s right to petition the government for redress of grievances.  See Bill Johnson’s Res-
taurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 741 (1983).  The Court noted “in recognition of the States’ com-
pelling interest in maintenance of domestic peace,” it had previously refused in San Diego Building
Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959), to preempt the states “from providing a civil remedy
for conduct touching interests ‘deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility.’”  Id.
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nomic marketplace.  The outcome of their pursuit may implicate future com-
mercial choices, as do most judicial pronouncements, but judicial results can
hardly be described as commercial.  If this were otherwise, Congress could ex-
ploit its Commerce Clause power to regulate not only the people’s access to
their local courts, but also the entire sphere of state court jurisdiction and pro-
cedures.  Clearly, the legislative, judicial, and individual activities sought to be
controlled by the pending legislation are not in any sense “commerce” and do
not have a direct or substantial effect on interstate commerce. Accordingly,
these activities cannot be regulated by Congress under the Commerce Clause.
Under this traditional approach, Congress would simply have no power to
regulate these remedial activities, and, consequently, could not  invoke the su-
premacy clause to protect its ultra vires legislation.
The second approach, by linking active and dormant Commerce Clause ju-
risprudence to the essential postulates of federalism, focuses on the extent of
power retained by the people and their respective states.  In other words, the
retained power validly exercised by the states necessarily restricts if not forbids
its exercise by Congress under the Commerce Clause. As grantors of all politi-
cal power, the people delegated limited powers to a federal government while
retaining and further developing their own state sovereignties.  Thus, the peo-
ple, by creating a federal government while preserving the governments of their
respective states, established the dual federal and state sovereignties that are
the essence of American federalism.  This historical duality, preserved and pro-
tected by the Constitution itself and its inherent structural assumptions, neces-
sarily envisaged not only a federal legal system, but also numerous sets of non-
uniform states laws, including private remedies, whether statutory or common
law, to be asserted and enforced in numerous and distinct state judicial systems.
More particularly, the provision of the remedies to those victimized by fraud
and breach of fiduciary duty in connection with securities investments has been
historically recognized as falling within the sacrosanct authority of the states to
regulate areas of traditionally local concern.
However, the states’ power in these areas, as discussed, is limited by the
Commerce Clause as judicially interpreted in a long line of dormant Commerce
Clause decisions.  The states’ power cannot be exercised in a manner that
would result in either discrimination against interstate commerce or in the im-
position of an excessive burden on interstate commerce. The state remedies
slated for elimination by the proposed federal legislation clearly are not dis-
criminatory, for they apply with equal force to both residents and non-residents
of the providing states and to both domestic and foreign corporations.  Moreo-
ver, these remedies, as previously explained, do not involve “commerce” but,
rather, the assertion of after-the-fact judicial remedies for “broken” commer-
cial transactions previously consummated.  In determining the “excessiveness”
of these remedies’ burden on interstate commerce, obviously both burden and
commerce must be the predicates for further analysis.  In other words, there can
be no burden where there is no commerce, and without that burden there can
be no excessiveness.  Were we to assume arguendo some burden on commerce,
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the courts generally have applied an ad hoc balancing test pursuant to which
the state’s regulatory interests are weighed against the actual effects of the
subject state laws on the flow of interstate commerce.  As seen, the courts have
accorded the greatest weight to state regulatory interests, like those at issue,
that fall within traditional state police power concerns.  In the application of
the ad hoc balancing test to the states’ investor protection remedies,  the states’
“sacrosanct authority” to protect investors against securities fraud and to pre-
vent their own citizens from committing that fraud, particularly their own lo-
cally created corporate issuers, would be heavily weighed against the remedy’s
indirect, incidental and after-the-fact impact, if any, on the flow of interstate
commerce.  Unquestionably, the states’ investor protection remedies continue
to survive Commerce Clause scrutiny and, being constitutionally reserved, can
not be stripped away by an aggressive Congress.  Once these dormant Com-
merce Clause issues are resolved in favor of the states, overriding state power
would be presumed.
While Congress has continuing authority to regulate interstate commerce in
securities, it can not regulate post-commerce securities fraud remedies constitu-
tionally provided by the states.  The states’ constitutional exercise of their pow-
ers to provide these remedies presumptively forecloses usurpation of these
powers by Congress acting under assumed Commerce Clause authority.  The
resultant presumption could be overcome only if, under strict scrutiny, it could
be clearly demonstrated that Congress, in regulating activities shown to have
substantial economic effects on interstate commerce, has a compelling federal
interest that could not be achieved by less restrictive means. Under this final
inquiry, requiring strict scrutiny of both the federal interests and the means by
which they are to be advanced, it is inconceivable that creating a national sys-
tem of securities litigation in order to achieve uniformity for a protected class
of defendants would be found sufficiently compelling to override the role of the
states in the protection of their investors and in the prevention of securities
fraud.  And it would be equally inconceivable that less drastically intrusive
means could not be employed.
V
CONCLUSION
This article has described recent congressional efforts to weaken federal
remedies for securities fraud, to eliminate before-the-fact review of securities
offerings by state administrative agencies and to preempt fraud and breach of
fiduciary duty remedies provided by state law.  The first two objectives already
have been achieved and the last objective now enjoys substantial bi-partisan
political support.  However, essential postulates of federalism, as recently rein-
vigorated by the Supreme Court, when linked to active and dormant Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence, are likely to present a difficult, if not insurmount-
able, barrier to legislation that would preempt investor remedies under state
laws.  As Chief Justice Marshall once stated, “no political dreamer was ever
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wild enough to think of breaking down the lines which separate the [s]tates, and
of compounding the American people into one common mass.”187  This was
true, perhaps, when those political dreamers were not financed by the vast
wealth of our present-day lobbying empires.  Today, political dreamers are en-
joying considerable success in making their dreams come true.  Unless the
courts vigorously apply constitutional restraints on congressional commerce
power, it will be our American federalism that becomes a dream.
                                                          
187. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403 (1819).
